State v. Pedersen Appellant\u27s Brief 2 Dckt. 41431 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-10-2014
State v. Pedersen Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 41431
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Pedersen Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 41431" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4784.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4784
IN E 
v. 
JUSTIN 
Defendant-Appellant 
Nature of the Case 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
41 1 
APPELLANTS 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1 0 
Justin Lee Pedersen asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion No. 84 (Ct App. Oct. 8, 2014) (hereinafter, 
Opinion). After the district court denied Mr. Pedersen's motion to suppress evidence 
found after a search of his jacket incident to his arrest, Mr. Pedersen entered a 
conditional guilty plea and appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction. 
The issue presented on appeal was whether Mr. Pedersen's right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth 
1 
1 
in 
the jacket, It was had access to or its 
Accordingly, Mr. failed of 
fell within an to the 
In 
conducted a valid search incident to Mr. In this Mr. Pedersen 
arrived at his house and spoke to Officer Jagosh. While Officer Jagosh stepped away 
to run his information, Mr. Pedersen emptied his pockets of valuable such as his wallet 
and cell phone and took off his jacket. He gave all of the items to a roommate who was 
seated on a chair by the front door, approximately fifteen feet away from where 
Mr. Pedersen was sitting. Officer Jagosh then placed Mr. Pedersen under arrest by 
putting him in handcuffs, after which asked another officer to retrieve the jacket and 
other items from the roommate. The jacket was retrieved and searched after 
Mr. Pedersen was handcuffed. Methamphetamine was found in the jacket. 
1 The item of clothing was described as a grey, hooded, zip-up sweatshirt. (Tr., p.17, 
L.24 - p.18, L.1.) The district court and counsel consistently referred to the sweatshirt 
as a "jacket," thus all references contained herein will be to Mr. Pedersen's jacket. (See 
Tr., p.17, L.20, p.79, L.14.) 
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Mr. submits that Opinion, which affirmed his of 
conviction, is in with the and Idaho Constitutions, 
decisions of Court, Idaho Court, Idaho 
found 
On 1 2013, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, Justin arrived 
home. (Tr.,2 p.7, Ls.8-25, p.8, Ls.22-25.) Mr. Pedersen was riding his motorcycle when 
he arrived at his home, and he was wearing gloves because it was a little chilly that day. 
(Tr., p.9, Ls.1-3, p.17, Ls.6-9.) As he pulled up to his home, he saw several cars parked 
alongside both sides of the road by his home, and he realized that they were police 
vehicles and there were police officers all about his property-in his driveway and in his 
yard. 3 (Tr., p.9, Ls.7-21.) Immediately after he pulled up to the house, an officer asked 
2 All references to "Tr." are to the transcript of the suppression hearing held on June 24, 
2013. 
3 Mr. Pedersen later learned that the officers and detectives were there to investigate a 
report of a stolen generator being advertised for sale on Craigslist. (Tr., p.41, Ls.3-17.) 
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was 
by the front door p.11, Ls:1 
Ls.1 p.29, Ls.1 took a on 
for finish running his 
) 
from 
u an 6 
(Tr., 1 1 p. 9, L.17.) After handcuffing Mr. the officer another 
4 As Mr. Pedersen pulled up to the home, a female had identified him as the person who 
~ave her the generator to sell. (Tr., p.42, Ls.11-20.) 
At the suppression hearing, Mr. Pedersen testified that, amongst his belongings, there 
was a "buck knife." (Tr., p.17, L.10.) No additional testimony was adduced regarding 
the "buck knife" and none of the officers testified that they feared for their safety due to 
the presence of a "buck knife." Further, the State conceded during argument at the 
suppression hearing that "there wasn't a weapon ... he could have used." (Tr., p.74, 
Ls.8-10.) This fact can be likened to the presence of the pizza-cutting knife in the hotel 
room in LaMay. See LaMay, 140 Idaho at 452 (finding that the knife which was used to 
cut pizza, and which was placed in a drawer by the officers, was an irrelevancy in the 
Court's analysis as the officers had no fear of it as a weapon); see also State v. 
Henage, 143 Idaho 655 (2007) (holding that, even though the suspect admitted to 
having a knife on his person, the officer did not identify any fact that demonstrated the 
suspect presented a potential threat, and therefore, the search was not justified under 
Terry). 
6 Although the State failed to offer any evidence of Mr. Pedersen's arrest warrant, 
apparently Mr. Pedersen had an outstanding warrant for a misdemeanor probation 
violation in Ada County Case No. 2013-2076. (Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository.) 
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it. (Tr., p.66, 9.) Detective searched the 
a crystal as in a 
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in violation of Pedersen's rights under Article I, '13 and 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution, and under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. (R., pp.53-54, 57-61.) Mr. Pedersen asserted that the search was 
not a valid search incident to arrest because the search was not justified by officer 
safety and the jacket and its contents were not in danger of being destroyed. 
(R., pp.57-60.) 
7 Officer Jagosh testified that he asked Detective Scully to get the jacket and items from 
Ms. Nucho after Officer Jagosh had handcuffed Mr. Pedersen and while he was 
searching Mr. Pedersen. (Tr., p.51, Ls.11-20.) Mr. Pedersen testified that Officer 
Jagosh asked Detective Scully to get the items from Ms. Nucho after he was handcuffed 
and while he was being led to the patrol car. (Tr., p.19, L.18- p.20, L.2.) 
8 Officer Jagosh testified, "So, you know, it's a sweatshirt. I didn't know what was in the 
pockets. While I'm handcuffing him, I don't know - I didn't know what it was. There 
could have been a weapon. There could have been evidence." (Tr., p.53, L.23 - p.54, 
L.2.) 
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7. 
8. While the defendant was waiting, he handed his gloves, his iPod, his knife, 
his wallet, and his cell phone to Colleen who was sitting on the steps next to 
the front of the house; 
9. The defendant knew that he had an outstanding warrant; 
10. Before the defendant handed the items to Colleen, Detective Jagosh 
instructed him to remain seated where he was, and the defendant specifically 
disregarded or disobeyed that instruction in getting up and moving over to 
where Colleen was; 
11. Defendant testified that it was chilly that evening in March. Colleen was 
located ten to 15 feet away from the defendant, and there was no one in 
between Colleen and the defendant; 
12. The defendant was arrested for an outstanding warrant and placed in 
handcuffs; 
13. The unidentified male in the back yard was "bigger and kind of intimidating;" 
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Following the denial his motion, entered a 
conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, reserving the right to 
appeal the suppression issue. (R., pp.86-89.) As part of the plea agreement, the State 
agreed not to file a persistent violator enhancement in another case. (R., pp.86, 89.) 
On September 13, 2013, Mr. Pedersen was sentenced to a unified sentence of seven 
years, with two years fixed, and the district court retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.90-94.) 
On September 18, 2013, Mr. Pedersen filed a Notice of Appeal from the judgment of 
conviction. (R., pp.96-99.) 
9 The district court provided these findings of fact in several paragraphs. These findings 
have been presented as individually numbered findings herein for ease of reading. 
10 Officer Jagosh testified that the purchase of something off of craigslist is "quite a big 
operation" and it called for "quite a few [officers]." (Tr., p.55, L.24 -- p.56, L.4.) He 
testified that the ratio of officers versus non-officers was "roughly the same." (Tr., p.52, 
Ls.17 -p.53, L.7.) 
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within the area of Mr. 
free from unreasonable 
was 
with 
United 
Court, the Court of Appeals incorrectly found that the police 
conducted a valid search incident to Mr. Pedersen's arrest. 
B. Standard For Granting Petitions For Review 
Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b) provides that, "[g]ranting a petition for review from a 
final decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court, 
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons .... " Factors to 
be considered include whether the Opinion is in conflict with a previous decision of 
either the Idaho Supreme Court, the Idaho Court of Appeals, or the United States 
Supreme Court. l.A.R. 118(b)(2) and (3). 
Mr. Pedersen submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his judgment of 
conviction, is in conflict with the United States and Idaho Constitutions, and previous 
10 
it 
d of his rights. 
secure in their 
is u 
discretion by governmental and thereby an individual's privacy and 
security against arbitrary invasions." State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 
2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979)). The Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable. See, e.g., State v. 
LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 837-838 (2004). The State may overcome the presumption of 
unreasonableness by demonstrating that the warrantless search fell within a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. LaMay, 140 Idaho at 838. If the 
State fails to meet this burden, the evidence acquired as a result of the illegal search, 
including later-discovered evidence derived from the original illegal search, is 
11 
in u (1 1 
of the 
Chime/ v. California, 395 U 
Chime/ Court on 
contemporaneous through a discussion of the decision in Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40 (1968): 
Peters involved a search that we upheld as incident to a proper arrest. We 
sustained the search, however, only because its scope had been 
"reasonably limited" by the "need to seize weapons" and "to prevent the 
destruction of evidence," to which Preston had referred. We emphasized 
that the arresting officer "did not engage in an unrestrained and thorough 
going examination of Peters and his personal effects. He seized him to cut 
short his flight, and he searched him primarily for weapons." 
Chime/, 395 U.S at 764 (1969) (quoting Sibron, 392 U.S. at 67) (holding that the 
incident search was justified "by the need to seize weapons and other things which 
might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to 
prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime"). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has applied the Chime/ standard and recognized the 
following factors in determining what is reasonably within an arrestee's area of 
12 
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which justify its v. 437 u (1978) 
(quoting v. Ohio, c1968)). 
in this a 
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court 
1. Mr. Pedersen's Jacket Was Not Within The Area Of "Immediate Control" 
At The Time The Jacket Was Searched, And Thus The Search Of The 
Jacket Does Not Fall Within The "Search Incident To Arrest" Exception To 
The Warrant Requirement 
The jacket was not within the area of "immediate control" of Mr. Pedersen as he 
was ten to fifteen feet away, the jacket was being sat on by Ms. Nucho, and 
Mr. Pedersen was handcuffed and in the presence and control of Officer Jagosh. 
After the suppression hearing, the district court made the following oral 
conclusions of law: 
The only question before this court - reiterating that the defendant is not 
contesting the stop in this case, the only question before the Court is 
whether this search of the defendant's jacket was a valid search incident 
to arrest. And I - both parties have cited at length the State v. Bowman 
case, where our Court of Appeals discussed the two rationales for the 
exception to the warrant requirement, first to protect an officer and other 
13 
And I think, frankly, I can go through the officers that were there, versus 
the - we have called them civilians that were there: One, two, three, four, 
five, six, seven civilians; one, two, three, four, five, six officers. So we are 
at about a one-to-one ratio. 
But that's not really controlling in this case, from my perspective, because 
this is not a controlled situation. This is a moving-parts situation. It's not a 
situation where everybody is in one place. You have people that are in 
the backyard ...... . 
There was also testimony that a Garden City officer - and I'll make this as 
a factual finding - pulled one of the civilians to the left side of the home. 
So we have a number of locations that are uncontrolled by these officers. 
And, frankly, even if there were eight officers to five civilians, even if they 
had outnumbered them, I can't say, given the moving parts and, frankly, 
the volatility of the situation, that the officers could be safe. 
I think that there was risk to the officers. And I think that the second 
prong, as far as the concealment or destruction of the evidence, also 
supports a finding that it was an appropriate search incident to arrest. 
14 
'p. ) 
had to, the of 
run fifteen over to where move her off the 
or destruction to the 
handcuffed and guarded Mr. was nonexistent: 
To determine whether a warrantless search incident to an arrest exceeded 
constitutional bounds, a court must ask: was the area in question, at the 
time it was searched, conceivably accessible to the arrestee-assuming 
that he was neither "an acrobat [nor] a Houdini"? 
United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal citations 
omitted). 
Mr. Pedersen would have had to be either "an acrobat" or "a Houdini" in order to 
escape the handcuffs and the officer guarding him, and dash 15 feet over to his 
roommate and then remove the jacket from under her and attempt to grab some sort of 
weapon or contraband. Additionally, where the Shakir Court held that the applicable 
standard required a "reasonable possibility" or "something more than the mere 
theoretical possibility that a suspect might access a weapon or evidence," the district 
15 
'140 Idaho 
a u 
in another room was not justified as a 
no 
or in 
consideration the fact that the the residence were , while civilians 
presumably were not. Nor was there any evidence that the civilians outside the house 
were uncooperative, threatening, or violent. Thus, where the basis for the warrant 
exception for a search incident to arrest is officer safety and to prevent destruction of 
evidence, neither of these excuses were applicable in this case. As a result, officers 
searched Mr. Pedersen's jacket without a valid exception to the warrant requirement, 
where the jacket was not within the area of "immediate control" of Mr. Pedersen under 
Chime/ v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
The Court of Appeals held that State v. Bowman, 134 Idaho 176 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that a woman holding the arrestee's jacket was approximately fifteen feet away 
and was thereby "within the zone of activity in which it could have been used by the 
16 
SU to an arrest warrant for armed 
in light 
robbery, and 
a 
that 
contact 
by 
was in an area with at 
rt 
one suspected confederate who was guarded only by unarmed hotel security guards. 
Shakir, 616 F.3d at 321. However, in Shakir, unlike the facts of Bowman or 
Mr. Pedersen's case, there was at least one verified confederate in the room with the 
arrestee who was not in police custody and could have possibly assisted the handcuffed 
arrestee. Id. at 319. Shakir is further distinguishable in that the bag searched in that 
case was on the floor at the feet of the arrestee, unlike the facts of Bowman or this case 
where the item seized was 15 feet away from the arrestee. 
17 
In 
of 
crime. In doing the district court ignoring 
was handcuffed or " Here, 
was handcuffed in the control 
was of control 
In 
a woman 
immediately prior to his Id. In determining area of immediate control, the 
Bowman Court used five factors identified by a legal treatise as facts that had 
historically been relied on by other courts. 134 Idaho at 179-80. The Court found the 
following facts determinative: that there was one officer and three civilians, the arrestee 
had "hastily" removed his jacket and was left standing in a T-shirt at 4:30 a.m. in 
January, the distance from the arrestee to the woman holding the jacket was less than 
fifteen feet, and the arrestee had not yet been handcuffed. Bowman, 134 Idaho at 180. 
The Court found that, had there been a weapon in the coat, all of the people involved 
were "within the zone of activity in which it could have been used by the woman or 
made available to the defendant." Id. at 180. The Court of Appeals then reasoned that: 
The potential for risk of harm to the officer on these facts was high. To 
allow a defendant to hand over an article of clothing just before his arrest 
18 
(internal citation 
The Idaho 
with the 
d court 
of 
of 
case closely on 
v. LaMay, 104 Idaho 
(1 
in 
of this but it neglected to appreciate the original reason behind the pertinent 
warrant exception-to protect officer safety and to prevent removal or destruction of the 
evidence of the crime. Thus, the district court neglected to consider LaMay, an Idaho 
Supreme Court decision that also utilized the factors set forth in Bowman, but 
addressed a situation where the arrestee was handcuffed and under the control of an 
officer like Mr. Pedersen was in this case. In failing to recognize LaMay, the district 
court ignored the importance of "whether the arrestee was handcuffed or otherwise 
restrained." LaMay, 140 Idaho at 839. Further, nothing about the test used by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals in Bowman and the Idaho Supreme Court in LaMay notes that it 
is necessary or even recommended, that the district courts give equal weight to each 
factor. In fact, it makes no sense to do so, particularly where the test adopted by the 
19 
In 
" Id. 
the 
a 
that the 
1 
encountered seven people in a hotel room. Id. 
an 
hand 
of the 
840. In 
LaMay was 
15 away from the backpack when it was . La May. 837 AO. The 
backpack contained cocaine. Id. The Court found that under these facts the backpack 
presented "no immediate danger to the officers or others surrounding the arrest." Id. at 
839. Nor was the backpack and its contents in danger of being destroyed. Id. Because 
LaMay's backpack was not seized during the period of time it was within his control, 
once the officers had secured their own safety and restrained LaMay, any justifications 
underlying the search incident to arrest exception ceased to exist. Id. at 840 (emphasis 
added). The Court held that the trial court properly applied the Chime/ test to the facts 
in determining that the backpack was not within LaMay's "immediate control" at the time 
of his arrest. Id. at 839. 
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In its Opinion, the Court of Appeals correctly noted that Mr. Pedersen did not 
argue on appeal the possibility that Ms. Nucho, the roommate with whom Mr. Pedersen 
deposited his jacket and gloves, would come to his aid or assistance by helping 
Mr. Pedersen acquire a weapon from the jacket. (Opinion, p.6.) However, this was a 
new argument by the State on appeal which was not advanced in the lower court and 
not part of the district court's analysis in its order denying the motion to suppress. 
(Tr., p.71, L.5 - p.82, L.7.) Further, there is no evidence whatsoever that Ms. Nucho 
was involved in the alleged generator theft and thus she clearly was not a confederate 
21 
in 
a 
31 
as "fruit of " 
111/ong Sun v. United 371 U.S. 471, 478~488 (1963). Mr. Pedersen 
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress. 
11 Apparently the person who listed the generator for sale on Craigslist was outside the 
residence speaking to a detective, but that person was not Ms. Nucho. (Tr., p.24, 
Ls.10-21, p.42, Ls.11-20, p.47, L.25-p.48, L.10.) 
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